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On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted in favour of ‘Brexit’.  This paper is an attempt to 
understand why.  It examines the micro-econometric predictors of anti-EU sentiment.  The 
paper provides the first evidence for the idea that a key channel of influence was through a 
person’s feelings about his or her own financial situation.  By contrast, the paper finds relatively 
little regression-equation evidence for the widely discussed idea that Brexit was favoured by 
the old and the unhappy.  The analysis shows that UK citizens’ feelings about their incomes 
were a substantially better predictor of pro-Brexit views than their actual incomes. This seems 
an important message for economists, because the subject of economics has typically avoided 
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"The Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s surge reflect discontent." Andrew Ross Sorkin, New York Times, 
29 February 2016. 
"I don’t think Brexit would have happened if it hadn’t been for the political and economic events of the 
preceding 10 years. People were disillusioned. They felt badly treated. They felt squeezed."  Alistair Darling, 
former Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Guardian, 13 September 2017 
"Why did millions vote to leave? …the big gap between those over 50 and those below in support for Leave."  
Ben Chu, The Independent, 26 June 2016 
 
 
1. Introduction  
This paper is an attempt to understand the outcome of the 2016 UK referendum on 
membership of the European Union.  That referendum led to what has become known as Brexit.  
The contribution of the current study is to provide evidence -- in a way consistent with work 
in other areas of economics such as Georgiadis and Manning (2013) and Grichnik, Smeja and 
Welpe (2010) -- that suggests it is necessary to appreciate the influential role played by human 
‘feelings’.  The paper focuses especially upon, and provides new evidence for, the predictive 
power of people’s feelings of discontent about their income.  We show that feelings about 
income can be more important than actual income. 
The reasons for Brexit have been widely discussed in the UK media.  Those discussions 
are captured in part by the kinds of quotations, particularly from Alistair Darling and Ben Chu, 
illustrated above.  These quotes (the one from Sorkin, interestingly, predates both Brexit and 
Trump) are meant only as examples.  They are used here as iconic cases of issues that have 
been debated across the UK about why it was that Brexit occurred.  Some newspaper and TV 
journalists have suggested that the decision to leave the EU was forced on the country by 
special groups (particularly old voters swamping the views of the young, or discontented 
citizens swamping the views of others).  Early academic writings on the topic also, and rightly, 
emphasized the concept of a divided nation (Dorling 2016, for example).  One purpose of the 
current paper is to try to probe the exact nature of the divisions. 
The principal objective of the paper is to try to gain some understanding of who voted 
for Brexit and what motivated them.  It is not possible to observe the confidential votes cast, 
on June 23rd 2016, in voting booths across the United Kingdom.  What later sections do, 
instead, is to investigate the patterns in citizens’ views in each week in the run-up period 
between January and June of that year.  The recent Understanding Society data set, based on 
random sampling, makes that feasible.  Using information from this source, we examine 
approximately 8000 citizens’ views on whether they felt the UK should leave, or remain within, 
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the European Union.  Some complementary evidence from the earlier British Household Panel 
Survey is also provided.  
2. Prior Research 
The paper builds upon a growing literature.  Important contributions, many of which 
may be seen eventually as seminal, have been made by scholars such as Shaw, Smith and Scully 
(2017), Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley (2017), Becker, Fetzer and Novy (2017), Dorling 
(2016), Goodwin and Milazzo (2017), Goodwin and Heath (2016), Heath and Goodwin (2017), 
and Hobolt (2016).  We confirm some of these articles’ early conclusions, such as the 
likelihood of highly-educated citizens favouring Remain.  Our work also relates to research 
that has begun to explore scepticism towards European Union values (such as Hobolt and de 
Vries 2016) and the probable cultural and economic repercussions of Brexit (Ginsburgh, 
Moreno-Ternero and Weber 2017). 
The above-mentioned research is generally consistent with later results in finding a 
negative effect of education and income on the Leave vote, and strongly significant effects 
from cultural identity and political preferences. The effect of age is arguably more complex: it 
enters with a positive sign in a regression including the simple linear coefficient (eg. Goodwin 
and Heat 2016), but features a significant concavity when the quadratic term is included (eg. 
Powdthavee et al. 2017).  Interestingly, Goodwin and Milazzo (2017), using the British 
Election Study, find only slight differences in coefficients for age groups above 34 years old.  
Moreover, Becker et al. (2017), in their work on regionally aggregated data, do not find an 
unambiguously positive and significant coefficient on a variable for the percentage of the 
population aged over 60 in a region.  
Early empirical studies that try to unpick the reasons for the Brexit vote have pointed 
to economic forces and immigration-related factors (for example, Clarke, Goodwin and 
Whiteley, 2017, although interestingly the work of Becker et al. 2017 argues that actual 
exposure to immigration was not particularly important).   Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) used 
data from the British Election Study (BES) to explore the influence of immigration on Brexit.  
They found that an increase in the rate of immigration at the local level, and attitudes to 
perceived immigration control, were key predictors of sympathy for Brexit.  Similarly, Hobolt 
(2016), who analysed campaign and survey data, showed that Brexit was favoured by the less-
educated, the poorer and older voters, and those who expressed concerns about immigration 
and multi-culturalism.   Goodwin and Heath (2016) attributed Brexit more specifically to the 
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‘left behind’, as caused by poverty and a general lack of education and opportunities.  The 
authors provided persuasive evidence that Brexit voters were consistently from among the 
poorest households, with incomes below £20,000 per year, the unemployed, in low-skilled and 
manual occupations, had worsened financial situations, and tended to have few qualifications.  
Indeed, Goodwin and Heath suggested that educational inequality might have been the 
strongest driver behind the Leave vote.1 
It has also been shown that turnout was higher in Remain areas, and where there were 
high numbers of young people, of ethnic minorities, and of university graduates (Heath and 
Goodwin, 2017).  However, in contrast to the tenor of some media reports that suggested voting 
for Brexit was more common in the North of England, Dorling (2016) has pointed out that the 
absolute numbers of Leave voters was higher in the South.  
Shaw, Smith and Scully (2017) tried to understand the referendum’s result by 
documenting the key campaigning messages promoted by each side.  They used causal-
mapping methods to analyse data from nine televised Brexit debates broadcast in the 4 weeks 
prior to the referendum. The authors found that the Leave campaign stuck closely to a small 
set of themes, repeated core values, and avoided topics viewed as important to Remain voters. 
By contrast, these authors show that the Remain side covered a much broader set of issues, 
were generally less consistent in their messages, and strayed into the themes propagated by 
Leave.   
By emphasizing the predictive power of human feelings, the current paper builds upon 
a general literature on the consequences of emotions and subjective wellbeing for voting 
behaviour.  Liberini et al. (2017) demonstrates that greater subjective wellbeing increases the 
probability of voting for the incumbent party. Along similar lines, but without explicitly using 
indices of SWB, Achen and Bartels (2004), Healy, Malhotra, and Hyunjung Mo (2010), 
Wolfers (2009) and Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2016) demonstrate how exogenous events that 
generate emotional reactions, but are unrelated to government actions, can affect the popular 
support for politicians. On the other hand, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) finds that the 
happiness of citizens with strong ideological identities can be affected by an electoral success 
                                                
1 1In a recent experimental study, Paetzel et al. (2014) show that in case of uncertainty about the future, those 
who are likely to lose from a reform will likely vote in its favor, provided it promises to enhance efficiency. In 
more general settings, Pecoraro (2017) shows that, under uncertainty with respect to future labour income, 
voters do not demand redistributive policies (such as those intended by the EU). 
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per se, rather than by the positive outcomes of valid implemented policies.  An introduction to 
the modern social-science of happiness can be found in sources such as Powdthavee (2010). 
By drawing upon the Understanding Society data set, the analysis produces two results 
that may not currently be widely understood.  First, somewhat in support of a version of 
Sorokin’s and Darling’s opinions, there is a little evidence that unhappy feelings contributed 
to Brexit.  Here our results are akin to a finding in new work by Alabrese et al. (2019), which 
documents a small, though significant, effect from the overall level of life satisfaction.  
However, our own analysis suggests that, as a matter of statistical predictors, the key channel 
of influence on Brexit voting was not through general dissatisfaction with life.  It was through 
a person’s feelings about his or her own financial situation.  Second, despite what some 
commentators have believed, on our estimates the Brexit decision was not, in any sharp sense, 
due to the old.  The Understanding Society data set suggests that ceteris paribus only the very 
youngest UK citizens -- particularly those under the age of 25 -- were substantially pro-Remain.  
Between the end of their 20s and their 70s, people who live in the UK apparently have, after 
adjustment for other characteristics, rather similar views on the desirability or not of EU 
membership.  
3. Survey Data   
The empirical work in the paper is based primarily on data from the UK’s 
Understanding Society data set (UNDSOC).  We draw on wave 8 of UNDSOC, which covers 
interviews2 conducted from January 2016 to December 2016,3 and we integrate these data with 
additional variables taken from previous waves of the UNDSOC and the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS).  The Understanding Society is a rich database, designed to be 
representative of the UK population as a whole, and collects information each year on over 
100,000 UK residents. It contains questions on political orientation and participation, voting 
behavior and intentions, life and financial satisfaction, as well as personal and demographic 
information on jobs, family status, income, and local authority of residence. Understanding 
Society builds on its predecessor project, the British Household Panel Survey.  Approximately 
                                                
2 From the UNDSOC data documentation:  “…Following this, a random interview date in the household is 
chosen. To compute derived interview dates, cross-wave inconsistencies in recorded interview dates were 
resolved” , available here https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/documentation/mainstage/dataset-
documentation/wave/3/datafile/c_indall/variable/c_intdaty_dv. “. 
 
3 The wave includes interviews conducted from January 2016 to June 2018, but we obtained and early access of 
the data which included interviews up to December 2017.  
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6,000 original participants from the BHPS agreed to join UNDSOC, which makes it possible, 
in certain circumstances, to combine data from the two studies.  
We seek to understand the possible role for ‘discontent’ in the Brexit vote.  How can 
that concept be incorporated into a statistical study of voting?  In the later analysis, we rely 
especially on two questions that are asked of respondents in the Understanding Society survey.  
An overall life-satisfaction question4  appears on page 523 of the Understanding Society 
questionnaire Wave 8 Consultation v02, 2016.  It is: 
On a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 = 'Completely Dissatisfied' and 7 = 'Completely Satisfied', please 
tell me the number which you feel best describes how dissatisfied or satisfied you are with the 
following aspects of your current situation. 
 
Satisfaction with life on a 7 point scale (with the answer % in parentheses) 
Completely dissatisfied   (2.2%) 
Mostly dissatisfied   (5.1%) 
Somewhat dissatisfied   (7.4%) 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied   (9.7%) 
Somewhat satisfied   (17.0%) 
Mostly satisfied   (45.5%) 
Completely satisfied.   (12.9%) 
 
A question about people’s feelings about their financial situation is asked on page 486 
of the Understanding Society questionnaire Wave 8 Consultation v02, 2016.  The wording is 
 
How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these days? Would you say you 
are...   
 
Subjective financial situation on a 5 point scale (with the answer % in parentheses) 
Living comfortably   (35.0%) 
Doing all right   (39.7%) 
Just about getting by   (19.0%) 
                                                
4 Such data have been widely used in other settings in quantitative social science (surveyed in Powdthavee 2010, 
for instance).  There have also been a number of attempts to validate life-satisfaction data.  Work by Oswald and 
Wu (2010), for example, provides evidence, using compensating-differentials theory and data on approximately 
1 million USA citizens, that there is a match between life-satisfaction scores and objective quality of life. 
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Finding it quite difficult   (4.7%) 
Finding it very difficult   (1.6%) 
 
Both of these are versions of people’s feelings – about, respectively, the overall quality 
of their life and, more specifically, how they feel they are doing in an economic sense.  
As a dependent variable in later regression equations, we will approximate 
Leave/Remain answers from a survey question asked on page 524 of the Understanding Society 
questionnaire Wave 8 Consultation v02, 2016.  The wording of that question is 
Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European 
Union? 
Options 
1 Remain a member of the European Union 
2 Leave the European Union 
 
For the regression equations, a variety of other variables will be included as independent 
controls.  These are of the type normal in quantitative social science.  They will include 
people’s age, gender, ethnic group, marital status, working status, region, trust in the 
institutions and so on. 
Table 1 sets out means and standard deviations for a number of the key variables used.  
Noticeably, the proportion ‘voting’ Brexit here, in the week before the referendum, is only 
42.5% of those giving a clear answer in the survey.  This percentage is unsatisfactorily low 
(because a narrow majority, just under 52%, in the actual vote favoured Brexit).   However, 
the statistical-sampling difficulty here is known to be a fairly common one.  As is now 
understood about the original opinion polls in the United Kingdom, and from the fact that the 
financial markets and betting bookmakers were not expecting the result of the referendum, 
many UK voters seem beforehand to have concealed their views and intentions.  One possible 
partial explanation is that a significant number of voters -- 7% in this survey -- declined to 
answer or said they were undecided.  However, that is still not quite enough to account for the 
full discrepancy.  A later section returns to this: it discusses issues of sample composition and 
the possible reasons behind an under-representation of Brexit supporters in social-science 
surveys.  
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The rest of Table 1 provides information about life satisfaction (its mean is 5.22 on a 
scale from 1 to 7) and feelings of financial difficulty (mean of 1.98 on a scale from 1 to 4).  
Standard demographic and personal variables are also reported. 
Table 2 gives the age distribution of the respondents in the sample.  Here we group 
individuals into 5-year bands, except for those over 70 years of age, whom we combine into a 
single category.  Approximately 17% of citizens in this sample are aged above 70.  Table 3 
gives further information about the different responses to the EU membership question. 
4. Main Results 
To examine the link between individuals’ preferences for Brexit and their characteristics, we 
estimate regressions of the form: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 	𝛼) + 𝛽	𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑡) + 𝛾	𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝛿𝑋) + 𝜀)                      (1) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a simple zero/one dummy to represent individuals’ views either against 
or for the European Union, 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑡 is a measure of an individual’s level of life satisfaction, 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑡 captures the person’s feelings about his or her financial situation, i is the person, 𝛼 is a 
constant term, and X is other covariates such as age and gender.    
We propose two ways to model life satisfaction and financial feelings -- by using 
individual dummies and by treating the variables as continuous. The extra symbol 𝑋 represents 
a vector of controls defined in the previous section, and 𝜀)  is an i.i.d. error term.  In all 
regressions we control for a week-of-interview dummy variable and dummy variables for the 
Local Authority District (LAD) /region of residence.  Robust standard errors, which are 
adjusted for clustering at the household level, are reported. The regression equations in the 
following tables are thus of an Ordinary Least Squares kind.  Although OLS here has technical 
drawbacks, more complicated kinds of estimators give the same results, so for simplicity we 
report estimates here in the OLS form.5  Estimation using probit or logistic regression is 
available on request. 
Table 4 provides the paper’s key results.  Non-responders to the EU membership 
question are here omitted (we later provide further information on the non-
respondent+undecided individuals).  
                                                
5
 Results for the marginal effects of the non-linear estimators are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to 
those for the coefficients of the linear probability model estimated with the OLS.  
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Is a low level of life-satisfaction predictive of someone being in favour of Brexit?  
Despite the plausibility of this idea, the regression equations offer relatively little evidence for 
such a view.   
Column 1 of Table 4 gives the coefficient estimates on the different life-satisfaction 
scores (to the best of our knowledge our econometric estimates are the first of their kind).  The 
base category for the life-satisfaction variable in the Column 1 regression is ‘completely 
dissatisfied’.  That extreme answer is given by 2% of the UK population.  There is little clear 
pattern across these different dummy variables; the standard errors on the coefficients are also 
large.  Table 4’s first column shows, for example, that the coefficient on ‘mostly dissatisfied’ 
is only marginally different from that on ‘completely satisfied’, at -0.0458 compared to -
0.0372.  Levels of life satisfaction per se here seem to have little predictive power.   
Yet, as we know show, this does not mean that human ‘feelings’ have no predictive 
role.  Table 4 reveals an interesting, and quantitatively powerful, pattern in the variable for 
respondents’ feelings about their finances.  Coefficients are reported for ‘doing all right’, ‘just 
about getting by’, ‘finding it quite difficult’, and ‘finding it very difficult’.  ‘Living 
comfortably’ is here the base category.  Unlike in the pattern for the life-satisfaction scores, a 
marked and monotonic incline in the coefficients is found.  In the fullest specification, that of 
column 3 of Table 4, the four coefficients on financial feelings are, respectively, 0.0332, 
0.0708, 0.0744, and 0.131.  These financial-feelings coefficients can be treated as approximate 
percentage amounts in a Brexit ‘voting’ equation.  Hence they are substantial in size.  For 
example, UK citizens who feel things are very difficult financially are approximately 13 
percentage points more likely (than those who feel their own finances are comfortable) to be 
in favour of leaving the European Union.  The pattern is illustrated in the right-hand side of 
Figure 1. 
We would also like to record that our results might be seen as compatible with recent 
work, done independently, by our colleague Thiemo Fetzer (Fetzer 2018).  He shows that 
‘austerity’ kinds of variable help to predict Brexit voting.  It may be that future research will 
be able to demonstrate the link between imposed financial austerity and people’s feelings of 
discontent with their income.   
Table 4 includes a set of dummy variables for age.  Was it, as some newspapers reported 
at the time, the ‘old’ who forced the UK out of the European Union?  On that issue, it is 
necessary to decide whether the analytical objective is to understand the predictive ‘raw’ effect 
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of age or the ‘regression-corrected’ consequence of age.  In column 1 of Table 4, the base 
category is young adults who are aged under 20 years old.  Relative to them, the coefficient on 
the 20-24 age category is 0.0187 with a large standard error.  Hence people in their early 
twenties appear to be slightly more in favour of Brexit than those under 20, but it is not possible 
to reject the null hypothesis, at 95% confidence, that their views are the same as the very young.   
From this point on in the age distribution, however, the results are different than might 
have been anticipated.  The age dummy-variable coefficients are much flatter than some 
commentators apparently believed.  The coefficients run from 0.204 for ages 25-29; 0.222 for 
ages 30-34; … 0.249 for 70 years and above.  Figure 2 illustrates this.  On the vertical axis is 
a measure of support for Brexit.  It can be seen that by the time people are in their 30s there is 
steady support for a pro-Brexit position (all relative, it should be emphasized, to the views of 
the young adult citizens who are under 20 years old in the Understanding Society data set).  
The natural conclusion from Figure 2 seems to be that support for the Leave side of the EU 
referendum follows a kind of step function in age-group.  It jumps up abruptly, and then runs 
almost horizontally.   
By contrast, if raw means in the data are examined, so that all the control variables are 
left out of a predictive equation, Figure 3 shows that the old are much more likely to favour 
Brexit.  The key point, however, is that this is not because of age per se.  Figure 3 is an 
uncorrected graph; it can be thought of as description rather than an analytical result.  In this 
general vein, interesting new work by Eichengreen et al. (2018) explores -- and is more 
favourable towards belief in -- a Brexit age-gradient.  The authors use a long time-series, which 
allows them to try to distinguish between cohort and other effects in a way not possible with 
our data set.  Eichengreen and his colleagues do not adjust for a large number of other variables, 
in the way our own work does, so it is not straightforward to compare the Eichengreen et al. 
results directly with those in the current paper’s tables.  
In their attitudes to Brexit, the young are highly pro-Europe.  However, the word 
‘young’ here means very young.  Once UK citizens reach their late 20s, in Figure 3 they are 
apparently behaving -- if we control for other variables -- in almost the same way as UK citizens 
in, for example, their 70s.  The data suggest that Brexit was not, in a deep sense, the result of 
many of the voters being old.  Instead, older voters have different characteristics.  
Table 4 allows other hypotheses to be explored.  A strong association is found between 
having high qualifications and favouring Remain.  The coefficient on having a degree is, in the 
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full specification, approximately -0.125.  Women are more favourable to the EU, by a 
substantial 8% points.  Having dependent children in the household leaves people statistically 
indifferent to the EU.   There is also evidence -- consistent with recent work by Alabrese et al. 
2019 -- of a large ethnic influence.  Those who classify themselves in the survey as Black or 
Mixed are markedly less likely to vote for Brexit, compared to individuals who classify 
themselves as white British (who in terms of numbers are around three quarters of those 
answering the UNDSOC survey).  The ethnic dummy-variable coefficients, in the columns of 
Table 4, average at approximately -0.18. 
Other attitudinal variables can be included as independent variables.  We find small but 
statistically significant differences among respondents who value the “importance of being 
British”; those who are highly trusting of their neighbours; and those who say they are very 
interested in politics. The first group is more likely to support Brexit, by approximately 2 
percentage points; the second group is rather in favour of remaining in the European Union, by 
3 percentage points; and the third group is more likely to support Brexit by another 3 percentage 
points.  
Most other variables fail to have statistically strong effects.  In the full specification of 
column 3 of Table 4, being ‘in work’ does enter negatively, with a small coefficient of -0.0291, 
but the standard error is 0.0175.  It might be thought (for example, from the careful analysis of 
district data by Becker et al. 2017), that unemployment per se would be crucial.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, a dummy variable for being unemployed into the regressions has a small 
coefficient that is never statistically significantly different from zero.  It may be that the Becker 
et al. (2017) results are consistent with our own and are capturing the important, and natural, 
connection at the regional level between high levels of unemployment and high levels of 
financial discontent.  We find that being married has no detectable effect on people’s views 
about Brexit.  Finally, and perhaps against some commentators’ intuitions, living in a rural area 
apparently has no discernible predictive consequences. 
Table 4 includes a number of independent variables whose coefficients are not reported 
explicitly in the table but are mentioned in the footnotes.  These are regional dummies (for the 
12 regions) and week-of-interview dummies (for 25 consecutive weeks) from January 2016 to 
June 2016.  The former pattern is depicted in Figure 4; the latter is given in Figure 5.  Scotland 
emerges, as known from other research, as the most pro-EU region of Great Britain.   
Figure 5 makes clear the upward trend in pro-Brexit attitudes through the year of 2016. 
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5. Consequences of Objective Income 
Overall, our analysis finds that financial feelings are one of the strongest predictors of 
citizens’ views on the desirability of Brexit.  One natural possible concern is that this is illusory 
– that it is instead because feelings about income are merely standing in for objective 
information on income.  However, as we now show, that apparently turns out not to be true.  In 
Table 5 we run a kind of statistical ‘horse race’ between objective income and subjective 
feelings about finances.   
Data on respondents’ incomes are unavailable for the latest waves of the Understanding 
Society Panel. To overcome this limitation, we propose a check that is explained in greater 
detail later, where we use income from previous waves to adjust for objective measures of and 
individual’s financial situation.  We take historical income data, from the 6th wave of the 
Understanding Society individual panel questionnaire.  Specifically, we use two variables: total 
monthly personal income (variable fimnlabgrs_dv) and total monthly labour income (variable 
fimnlabgrs_dv), both in gross figures and capped at 15,000 GBP per month.  In addition, we 
collect local authority district (LAD) 2016 wage data from the Office of National Statistics, 
and can thus construct measures capturing respondents’ relative income position compared to 
that of their “neighbours”. The first one, on Relative Income, is calculated as the ratio between 
a respondent’ total income and LAD of residence’s median income (expressed in logs).  As an 
additional measure we also propose an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual total 
monthly labour income exceeds the LAD monthly pay median income. A caveat in this analysis 
is that we can only use a restricted sample of individuals -- those with observed income.  
Table 5 re-estimates the models in column (3) of Table 4, but now controlling also for 
objective income. Columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 5 incorporate Life Satisfaction and 
Subjective Financial Situation as categorical variables, as before, while columns (2), (4) and 
(6) treat both variables continuously. For the income measure, we use total personal monthly 
income (columns (1)-(2)), total labour income (columns (3)-(4)) and the relative income 
indicator (columns (5)-(6)).   
The inclusion of objective income does have some effect on the size of the coefficient 
on subjective financial situation, but it does so only slightly. In particular, its inclusion does 
not alter the paper’s main finding about ‘feelings’.  As shown in the two parts of Figure 1, 
feelings about a person’s financial situation emerge as more important, as a predictor of Brexit 
views, than that person’s actual income.  As one illustration, if a person feels that his or her 
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financial situation is ‘very difficult’, that is associated with favouring Brexit by approximately 
13 extra percentage points, whereas earning a (low) income of less than 1000 pounds sterling 
a month is associated with favouring Brexit by approximately 5 extra percentage points.    
6. Further Checks  
Other results are described in the online Appendix.  Table A1 goes through results for 
variations of column 6 of Table 5, where we experiment with combinations of objective and 
subjective income measures.  A possible concern, of course, is that subjective financial 
situation is not necessarily exogenous. There is no easy answer to this difficulty.  To try 
somewhat to address it, we build on the intuitive idea that a human being’s ‘feelings’ may be 
shaped by comparisons with others.  Thus in the Appendix we re-estimate the baseline model 
of column 6 of Table 5, and instrument feelings about financial situation with measures of an 
individual’s relative income (measured relative to those people in the local geographical area). 
This choice is motivated by a literature in economics, psychology and sociology highlighting 
the importance of relative income for (financial) satisfaction (which include among others 
Clark and Oswald (1996), Clark et al.  (2008), Senik (2004, 2008), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), 
Caporale et al. (2009), Knies (2012), and McBride (2001)). The validity of our instrument 
assumes that the relative income position of a respondent can be based on the respondent’s past 
income level (exogenous because evaluated in the past) and on the median income level from 
the local authority district where the respondent resides.   
Table A1 gives results from that exercise.  In column (1) of Table A1 we replicate 
column (6) of Table 5 which is our baseline model; columns (2) to (5) experiment with 
variations of the baseline model by adding additional income controls. The subjective measure 
of financial situation is statistically significant and has the expected sign.  Columns (6) to (8) 
of Table A1 present the results for IV estimation when subjective financial situation is 
instrumented with measures of relative income. The Hansen Sargan test reported at the bottom 
of the table does not reject the instrumenting.  
We explore three other possibilities to rule out the case that the relative income affects 
both perceptions on income and perceptions about institutions.   
First, we re-run the pro-Brexit equation excluding respondents who live in London. 
Second, given that in the UK much of the possible substitution between public and private 
services is in the education sector, we run our pro-Brexit equation excluding respondents with 
school-age children. Third, we use an alternative version of the instrument, that also accounts 
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for the variance of income within the LAD.  Results are given in Table A2 of the online 
Appendix. 
As a final exercise, in Table A3 in the online Appendix, we allow the effect of Life 
Satisfaction (columns (1) and (3)) and the effect of Subjective Financial Situation (columns (2) 
and (4)) to vary, according to whether the respondent reports labour income levels higher than 
the LAD median. In general, we find that individuals who report higher income than the LAD 
median are less likely to support Brexit. In our column (4), the results also suggest that 
respondents who are finding their financial situation very difficult are more likely to support 
Brexit, unless they also report higher income than their LAD median, in which case they tend 
to be in favour of the status quo, and prefer the UK to retain EU membership. 
6.1 Alternative Samples: Understanding Society post-referendum and BHPS data 
The regression-equation analysis in earlier sections chose to exclude people who were 
interviewed after the 23rd June Referendum took place.  That is because at the time of the 
interview those later individuals already knew, of course, the outcome of the vote.  However, 
it is interesting to wonder whether the answers to the EU membership questions given with the 
knowledge of the referendum outcome are structurally different from those answers given 
before the 23rd June 2016.  In addition, it is interesting to probe the robustness of our estimates 
to a model that employs sampling weights.  These can, in principle, be used only on the full-
waves sample, and therefore require us to include all respondents.  Table A4 gives the results 
of these exercises.  All specifications here use sampling weights. Consistently across all 
specifications, it seems that knowledge of the actual referendum outcome does not greatly 
affect the spirit of our main results. 
It is natural to wonder whether there is something special, and potentially unreliable, 
about UNDSOC data.  As an additional robustness check, therefore, we exploit the fact that in 
waves 9, 12 and 166 of the BHPS survey the respondents were asked questions about their 
attitude towards the European Union.  The wording is not dissimilar to that asked in wave 8 of 
UNDSOC.   
The BHPS questions are: (i) EU-Bad17, where respondents had to evaluate on a scale 
from 1 to 3 if “UK membership of EU is a good thing (equal to 1), neither a good or a bad (2) 
                                                
6 These waves refer to interviews which took place in 1999, 2002, 2006. 
7 This variable is based on BHPS-opeur1. 
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and, a bad thing (3)”; (ii) EU-Bad28 where respondents are asked whether “UK benefited from 
being in EU”, we reverse-coded the variable on scale where 1 is associated with  “no” and 0 
with “yes.” There are also some interesting and possible relevant variables which are included 
in the BHPS but not in UNDSOC; these are indicators of risk aversion and of trust, which are 
both measured on a 1 to 10 scale. A part from these new variables most of the other regressors 
included in the Pro-Brexit equation from UNDSOC are also available in the BHPS; 9 so we 
can to re-run a standard equation using the BHPS. This allow us to explore whether Brexit was 
a kind of one-time shock or a signal of a deeper disaffection with the European Union?10  
Table A5 displays summary statistics; Tables A6 and A7 report the results from the 
estimation of ‘Pro-Brexit regression equations’ based on BHPS data.  Here EU-Bad1 and EU-
Bad2 are, in turn, the dependent variables, and the format of the tables is similar to previous 
tables. Overall, these BHPS results seem encouragingly in line with previous UNDSOC ones. 
As with the UNDSOC sample, life satisfaction does not seem entirely robustly predictive of 
preferences towards the EU, although it works considerably more strongly in BHPS than 
before. The new variables proxying for risk aversion and trust are significant: more risk-averse 
individuals and more-trusting people are happier in the EU than those with the opposite 
attributes.  Crucially, the BHPS equations continue to find a strong predictive role for feelings 
about a person’s financial satisfaction.  
6.2 On Discrepancies between UNDSOC data and the Brexit vote  
A previously mentioned concern is that the sample proportion of the pro-Brexit 
respondents is less than in the actual Brexit vote. Respondents interviewed for Understanding 
Society thus seem to under-represent the actual support for Leave.  
One possible reason is that Brexit supporters were unwilling to express their political 
views in the survey (perhaps because of ‘social desirability’ concerns).  Social-image 
maintenance is known to matter (DellaVigna, List and Malmendier, 2012; DellaVigna et al., 
2017). There is evidence that even individuals with strong political views might avoid publicly 
expressing them if they believe their opinion is not popular in their social environment 
(Bursztyn et al., 2016). But social norms can change quickly, as a consequence, for example, 
of an (unanticipated) election result.  Bursztyn,  Egorov and  Fiorin (2017) show that Donald 
                                                
8 This variable is based on BHPS-opeur2. 
9 We have excluded the ethnic-origin variables because of the very high frequency of missing values.  
10 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this route. 
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Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election increased individuals’ perception of the 
social acceptability of holding strong anti-immigration (or xenophobic) views and their 
willingness to publicly express them. Mutatis mutandis, we can apply this logic to the Brexit 
vote, and exploit the data originating from the interviews which took place during the post- 
referendum period, i.e. from 24th June to 31st December 2016.   
Some individuals may have refused to answer the EU membership question merely 
because their interview took place before the referendum. These individuals, if interviewed 
after the referendum, may have felt confident enough to reveal their preference against the EU. 
Over six percent of people interviewed in the pre-referendum sample left blank the answer on 
the EU. Following the same logic, other individuals might have, instead, answered that they 
were in favour of remaining in the European Union, only because they were unwilling to reveal 
their (at the time) ‘socially unacceptable’ preference.  
A second concern is selective participation in the Understanding Society study. One 
could argue that those who are dissatisfied with the political and societal situation are less likely 
to participate in a social-science survey.  A non-negligible proportion of respondents in the 
pre-referendum sample (seven percent) declared themselves to be not decided about whether 
the UK should stay in the EU.  The number of individuals who declare no opinion regarding 
EU membership goes down over time. If we compare the before and after Brexit distribution 
of individuals, the only growing category is that of individuals preferring to leave the EU, and 
the only shrinking category is that of the individuals who were undecided at the time of the 
first interview (Figure A1).  
Next, therefore, we exploit the responses of those who were interviewed after the 23rd 
June -- the assumption being that post-referendum answers are likely to be unconstrained by 
issues of social acceptability or to be the outcome of informed choices. We estimate our 
baseline model on the sample of respondents interviewed after the 23rd of June 2016. Then, we 
use the obtained estimates to predict the Brexit vote for the individuals interviewed before the 
referendum took place.	11   Re-attributing respondents to the Leave/Remain options gives us a 
new imputed Brexit vote distribution for the pre-referendum interviewees.  
                                                
11 This is based on a cut-off rule at the mean of the predicted probability of those who responded “leave”. To 
note that, among those interviewed before the referendum, the mean (median) of the predicted value for those 
who voted Remain is 0.531(0.532), and it is instead 0.652(0.692) for those who voted leave and 0.622(0.654) for 
those who answered "don't know". So, before setting any threshold, we find that those who selected "don't know" 
are more similar to the leavers than to the Remainers. Looking at the model performance, we find that the 
percentage of correctly classified cases is equal to 66.11% when the threshold is set to 0.5, equal to 62.55% and 
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Table A8 gives a transition matrix based on this exercise, which suggests that the 
respondents who refused to answer were split among the Remain and Leave vote, but 60 per 
cent of the respondents who were undecided can be allocated to the Leave vote, according to 
the post-referendum model. The share of respondents who expressed a preference for Remain 
and who are allocated to the Leave vote (43.18%) is larger than the share of respondents who 
expressed a preference for Leave and are instead allocated to the Remain vote (36%).  
We perform a further exercise. We re-aggregate the preferences for leaving and 
remaining on the basis of the transition matrix displayed in Table A8. Figure A2 shows our 
results. It suggests that accounting for the allocation of the undecided individuals to the leave, 
based on “estimated” preferences for the EU membership, delivers figures that are quite close 
to the referendum outcome.   
As a final check, we re-estimate our standard equation for the pre-referendum sample, 
but now replacing the responses on the opinions on EU membership of those who were 
undecided or did not answer (and who were not included in the baseline regression sample) 
with the predictions to the same question based on post-referendum sample. Results are 
displayed in Table A9.  From inspection of the table, we see that the results are in line with 
earlier regressions.   
Another possibility is that, on June 23rd, many of those UK citizens who favoured the 
EU simply failed to go to the polls to vote.  Perhaps they felt less intensely about the issue than 
the Brexiters.  Our data do not allow us to judge the strength of feeling, either for or against 
the EU, of survey respondents.  If the anti-EU individuals had, relatively, much stronger 
preferences than those who wished for Remain, the people who desired Brexit might have been 
more inclined to go to the polling stations on referendum day.  Abstentions by pro-EU citizens 
might have been influential.  
The UNDSOC question on EU membership is in a sense hypothetical and does not refer 
to participation to the Brexit referendum.  UNDSOC asks about general preferences over EU 
membership. However, we explore this debate about ‘selection’ in the participation to the 
referendum (i.e. those who wanted Remain did not go to the voting booths sufficiently) by 
                                                
59.96% when set to 0.65 and to 0.7, respectively. However, in all cases the model performs better at predicting 
the leave votes (the model has high sensitivity and low specificity). Finally, we checked how the percentage of 
predicted leave/remain votes changes over different threshold levels, and we find that the share of predicted leave 
vote stays constant at 52.13 for all threshold values equal and smaller than 0.75. Graph visualising this exercise 
is available upon request. 
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looking at respondents’ voting records in the past years and we re-estimate Eq. (1) augmented 
with a new variable PastVote.  Using this reduced sample, our main previous results hold.  The 
variable PastVote is not significantly different from zero, which suggests that voting habits are 
not distributed differently across Brexiters and non-Brexiters.  We cannot be certain, of course, 
about whether our measure of voting habits applies to voting in this very special kind of 
referendum per se.12  
7. Discussion  
The analysis has a number of limitations that should be noted.   
First, although the patterns discussed above may help us to understand individuals’ 
voting for Brexit, the analysis is necessarily a study of associations in the data.  We are not 
able to say, with scientific certainty, that variables Y or Z caused Brexit.  This is particularly 
relevant when considering the hypothesis that unhappy feelings in the UK helped lead to the 
Brexit decision.  While we have experimented with a number of possible instrumental-variable 
strategies, this paper presents only instrumented econometric estimates for a subset of the 
sample for which we have available income data.  We can legitimately say that people’s 
financial worries, for instance, are strongly associated with favouring the Leave side of the 
argument, but we cannot firmly establish that financial worries literally caused people to favour 
Brexit. 
Second, it could perhaps be argued more reasonably that we have probed the causal 
effects from age, on the grounds that age is exogenous, and thus that it will be orthogonal to 
other regressors in the equation.  However, even here, individuals cannot be forced to take part 
in the survey; nor can they be compelled to answer particular questions within the survey form.  
Hence there could, in principle, remain some selection-effect biases even on the age 
coefficients. 
Third, the low overall figure for people who are pro-Brexit in this data set remains a 
concern to us.  Admittedly, it is not necessary statistically to have a random sample to estimate 
regression equations, so our inferences on the role of financial feelings may be immune to this 
concern.  Moreover, like other analysts, we have to use the data set as it comes to us.  
Nevertheless, at face value, there must presumably be some kind of inaccuracy in the data 
collection.  Even in week 25 of the year of 2016, we find, in this data set, only 42.5% of the 
                                                
12 Output for this exercise is available upon request. 
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population saying they definitely want to leave the European Union.  There is no easy 
explanation for this puzzle.   
Fourth, and relatedly, it might be that attrition within the sample is leading to difficulties 
in inference (Danny Dorling raised this interesting point with us), if more ‘stable’ people are 
systematically more likely to favour Remain.  Again this would be a form of selection bias and 
there is no simple way to fix that potential difficulty.  
8. Conclusions 
The UK’s decision to leave the European Union is one of the major political events of 
modern European history.  This paper is an attempt to understand its roots.  Our analysis cannot, 
in a strict scientific sense, establish the causes of Brexit.  What it does instead is to document 
the micro-econometric predictors of Brexit voting.    
We have drawn, for this analysis, upon recently released data to try to probe the 
motivations of UK citizens for voting Leave or Remain in the 2016 UK referendum on 
membership of the European Union.  It is not possible -- for any social scientist -- to know the 
individual answers given on June 23 within the private voting booths across the United 
Kingdom.  What the paper is able to do, however, is to examine the patterns in citizens’ 
expressed views on the days and weeks running up to the election.  The Understanding Society 
data set, which uses random sampling, and has the advantage that it is not run by a political-
polling company, makes that possible.  In the present inquiry, the data set provides information 
on approximately 8000 citizens’ views.  We also draw on some results using earlier BHPS 
data. 
The paper has presented data on raw averages and also a selection of results from 
regression equations.  The former allows a simple description of survey answers; the latter 
provides an analytical attempt to hold constant other influences.  Neither of these is ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’, because they measure different things.  The paper places more emphasis on the latter 
method – the one based on regression equations and thus on ceteris paribus judgments.  We 
are interested in, for example, how being female or having a university degree, per se, 
influenced people’s views.  To do so it is necessary to control for other characteristics of 
females and of degree holders. 13   
                                                
13 Some researchers have documented ‘raw’ Brexit-voting patterns but we concentrate on regression-adjusted 
ones.  It is possible, instead, to calculate in the raw data how the average woman voted, or how the average degree-
holder voted.  But by using a regression-equation method we can adjust for the fact that, for example, women 
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We have documented a range of statistically significant predictors of anti-EU 
sentiment.  Our analysis does not detect major influences from age or life satisfaction.   
Instead, the paper’s main -- and we believe new -- contribution is to point to a strong 
predictive role for people’s feelings about their financial situation.  Consider those who, 
respectively, described their financial situation as living comfortably, doing all right, just about 
getting by, finding it quite difficult, and finding it very difficult.  The individuals giving lower 
answers, after adjusting for other influences, were systematically much more likely to favour 
leaving the EU.  Compared to those ‘living comfortably’, the other categories favoured Brexit 
in a steadily increasing way by, respectively, the following percentage points: 3%, 7%, 8%, 
and 13%.  One reason this finding may matter in political science, and perhaps more broadly 
in the practical political world, is that it is not clear that voting in an anti-EU way is capable of 
solving the problem of how someone feels about their finances.   
Feelings about income are, in our data, a substantially better predictor of Brexit voting 
than is actual income.  This seems an important message for economists.  The subject of 
economics has tended to avoid the study of human feelings in favour of ‘objective’ data.  
  
                                                
have a higher average age in the population and degree-holders have a lower average age.  If we rely only on the 
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Figure 1.  In Predicting Brexit Voting, Financial Feelings were Approximately Twice as 




Notes. The vertical axis here gives a measure of the probability points of a person favouring Brexit.   The bar 
charts report the coefficients estimated in regression equations (see Table 5, column 1).  The base categories in 
the two sections of the above diagram are, respectively, earning more than 5000 pounds sterling a month, and 
‘living comfortably’.  For example, someone who feels their financial situation is ‘very difficult’ is 13 






Figure 2. The Regression-Corrected Age-Profile of Those Who Wanted to Leave the EU 
(as calculated from a Brexit equation: Column 1 of Table 4)    (95% CI shown) 






Figure 3. The Uncorrected Age-Profile of Those Who Wanted to Leave the EU   (95% CI 
shown) 
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Figure 4. The Regional Distribution of Those Who Wanted to Leave the EU (as 
calculated from a Brexit equation: Column 3 of Table 4)    (95% CI shown) 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Main Sample (UNDSOC wave 8) (where R 
is the survey respondent). The first three rows are for the available samples, weighted, and not just for the 






























































































































*Observations used in the actual regressions = 7,091, from Understanding Society Panel Survey 
(UNDSOC), Wave 8. 
Respondents aged 18 and above interviewed between 5th January 2016 and 22 June 2016.  
The regression equations given later in the paper use unweighted data (as is conventional with such 












Table 2. Distribution of the Respondents’ Ages (for the sample used in regression equations) 5-year 
intervals. 
 
								Intervals		 						Freq.					 	Percent				 					Cum.	
		18-19	years	old*	 								108			 1.34	 1.34	
		20-24	years	old		 								469						 5.84	 7.18	
		25-29	years	old		 								455						 5.66	 12.84	
		30-34	years	old		 								512						 6.37	 19.21	
		35-39	years	old		 								658			 8.19	 27.40	
		40-44	years	old		 								720				 8.96	 36.36	
		45-49	years	old		 								804			 10.00	 46.37	
		50-54	years	old		 								823					 10.24	 56.61	
		55-59	years	old		 								743				 9.25	 65.85	
		60-64	years	old		 								678					 8.44	 74.29	
		65-69	years	old		 								682						 8.49	 82.78	
70	years	or	older		 						1,384						 17.22	 100.00	
												Total		 						8,036				 100.00	 	
 





Table 3. Distribution of Responses on the EU Membership Question 
 
Should	UK	remain	a	member	of	the	EU?			 Freq.	 Percent	 Cum.	
Missing		 226	 2.57	 2.57	
Refusal				 139	 1.58	 4.16	
Don't	know		 625	 7.12	 11.28	
Remain	a	member	of	the	European	Union		 4,632	 52.77	 64.05	
Leave	the	European	Union		 3,155	 35.95	 100.00	
Total	 8,777	 100.00	 	
	











Table 4.  Pro-Brexit Regression Equations. OLS Cross-Sectional Estimates with Banded Life-Satisfaction 
and Financial-Feelings Dummy Variables. 
 
	 Pro-Brexit	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
		 		 		 		
Satisfaction		with	life:		    
																																					Mostly	dissatisfied	 -0.0458	 	 -0.0455	
	 (0.0464)	 	 (0.0462)	
																																						Somewhat	dissatisfied	 -0.0447	 	 -0.0493	
	 (0.0443)	 	 (0.0441)	
Neither	satisfied	nor	dissatisfied	 0.00763	 	 0.00796	
	 (0.0434)	 	 (0.0432)	
												Somewhat	satisfied	 -0.0508	 	 -0.0449	
	 (0.0413)	 	 (0.0413)	
			Mostly	satisfied	 -0.0773*	 	 -0.0606	
	 (0.0400)	 	 (0.0400)	
					Completely	satisfied	 -0.0372	 	 -0.0145	
		 (0.0422)	 		 (0.0422)	
Subjective	financial	situation:		    
						Doing	all	right	 	 0.0332**	 0.0332**	
	  (0.0137)	 (0.0138)	
									Just	about	getting	by	 	 0.0748***	 0.0708***	
	  (0.0177)	 (0.0181)	
																																											Finding	it	quite	difficult	 	 0.0810***	 0.0744**	
	  (0.0297)	 (0.0303)	
																																											Finding	it	very		difficult	 	 0.143***	 0.131**	
		 		 (0.0501)	 (0.0512)	
Age	group:		    
20-24	yrs	old	 0.0187	 0.0200	 0.0156	
	 (0.0478)	 (0.0485)	 (0.0480)	
25-29	yrs	old	 0.204***	 0.201***	 0.196***	
	 (0.0502)	 (0.0508)	 (0.0504)	
30-34		yrs	old	 0.222***	 0.218***	 0.213***	
	 (0.0501)	 (0.0508)	 (0.0504)	
35-39	yrs	old	 0.241***	 0.235***	 0.233***	
	 (0.0485)	 (0.0490)	 (0.0486)	
40-44	yrs	old	 0.236***	 0.226***	 0.223***	
	 (0.0491)	 (0.0497)	 (0.0492)	
45-49	yrs	old	 0.250***	 0.242***	 0.237***	
	 (0.0472)	 (0.0477)	 (0.0474)	
50-54	yrs	old	 0.249***	 0.241***	 0.236***	
	 (0.0464)	 (0.0470)	 (0.0466)	
55-59	yrs	old	 0.255***	 0.251***	 0.247***	
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	 (0.0467)	 (0.0472)	 (0.0469)	
60-64	yrs	old	 0.254***	 0.252***	 0.248***	
	 (0.0468)	 (0.0474)	 (0.0470)	
65-69	yrs	old	 0.265***	 0.266***	 0.263***	
	 (0.0473)	 (0.0479)	 (0.0474)	
Over	70	yrs	old	 0.249***	 0.252***	 0.249***	
		 (0.0455)	 (0.0461)	 (0.0456)	
University	degree	 -0.131***	 -0.127***	 -0.125***	
																																					(0.0129) (0.0130)	 (0.0130)	
Female	 -0.0793***	 -0.0781***	 -0.0779***	
																	(0.0114)	 (0.0114)	 (0.0114)	
Has	children	 0.0104	 0.00361	 0.00481	
																	(0.0182)	 (0.0183)	 (0.0182)	
Ethnicity		    
Asian	 -0.0370	 -0.0389	 -0.0414	
	 (0.0311)	 (0.0314)	 (0.0312)	
Black	 -0.168***	 -0.184***	 -0.185***	
	 (0.0369)	 (0.0378)	 (0.0375)	
Mixed	 -0.178***	 -0.186***	 -0.186***	
	 (0.0414)	 (0.0419)	 (0.0416)	
Other	 -0.117	 -0.130	 -0.128	
		 (0.0799)	 (0.0809)	 (0.0804)	
Importance	of	being	British	 0.0201***	 0.0205***	 0.0204***	
(0-low	to	10-very	high)	 (0.00201)	 (0.00201)	 (0.00201)	
Trust	in	your	neighbours	 -0.0342***	 -0.0313***	 -0.0311***	
(1-very	low	to	5-very	high)	 (0.00805)	 (0.00809)	 (0.00810)	
Interest	in	politics	 0.0293***	 0.0295***	 0.0279***	
(1-very	low	to	4-very	high)	 (0.00723)	 (0.00722)	 (0.00723)	
Unemployed	 -0.0204	 -0.0273	 -0.0325	
	 (0.0356)	 (0.0356)	 (0.0356)	
Working		 -0.0339*	 -0.0335*	 -0.0291*	
																																 (0.0174)	 (0.0174)	 (0.0175)	
Married		 -0.0119	 -0.00815	 -0.00719	
													(0.0136)	 (0.0136)	 (0.0137)	
Rural	area	 0.00336	 0.00364	 0.00418	
																												 (0.0152)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0151)	
Observations	 7,091	 7,091	 7,091	
R-squared	 0.093	 0.094	 0.096	
    
Robust standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses:  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  Table notes in order are:   
(a) Overall satisfaction with life: coded from completely dissatisfied (1) to completely satisfied (7).  Completely dissatisfied is the base category. 
(b) Subjective financial situation: from living comfortably (1) to finding it very difficult (5).  Living comfortably is the base category. 
(c) Age group: 5-year intervals. Base category is 18-19 years old.  
(d) Base category is white.  Base category for employment-status groups together all the other categories because were insignificantly different 
from one another. 
(e) Regional dummies included in all regressions: North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of 




Table 5. Pro-Brexit Regression Equations. OLS Cross-Sectional Estimates with Banded and Continuous Life-
Satisfaction, Financial-Feelings, and Income.  
 
		 	 	 	 	 	 	
		 Pro-Brexit	Equations	Using	a	Variety	of	Different	Independent	Variables	for	Income	
	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 With	Total	Income	 With	Labour	Income	 With	Relative	Income	
Satisfaction		with	life:		 	 	 	 	 	  
																																					
Mostly	dissatisfied	 -0.0467	 	 -0.00103	 	 -0.0556	 	
 (0.0478)	 	 (0.0710)	 	 (0.0843)	 	
																																						
Somewhat	dissatisfied	 -0.0509	 	 0.0104	 	 -0.0664	 	
 (0.0457)	 	 (0.0692)	 	 (0.0838)	 	
Neither	satisfied	nor	
dissatisfied	 0.00446	 	 0.0431	 	 -0.00733	 	
 (0.0446)	 	 (0.0680)	 	 (0.0812)	 	
												Somewhat	
satisfied	 -0.0479	 	 0.00800	 	 -0.0265	 	
 (0.0427)	 	 (0.0660)	 	 (0.0790)	 	
			Mostly	satisfied	 -0.0620	 	 -0.0396	 	 -0.102	 	
 (0.0414)	 	 (0.0644)	 	 (0.0770)	 	
					Completely	satisfied	 -0.0182	 	 0.0165	 	 -0.0600	 	
		 (0.0436)	 	 (0.0671)	 	 (0.0803)	 	
Satisfaction		with	life	(as	
a	continuous	measure):		 	 -0.00379	 	 -0.00999*	 	 -0.0135*	
		 	 (0.00431)	 	 (0.00560)	 	 (0.00710)	
Subjective	financial	
situation:		 	 	 	 	 	  
						Doing	all	right	 0.0322**	 	 0.0163	 	 -0.0114	 	
 (0.0141)	 	 (0.0169)	 	 (0.0214)	 	
									Just	about	getting	
by	 0.0690***	 	 0.0444*	 	 0.0315	 	
 (0.0184)	 	 (0.0228)	 	 (0.0287)	 	
																																											
Finding	it	quite	difficult	 0.0722**	 	 0.0333	 	 -0.0215	 	
 (0.0310)	 	 (0.0411)	 	 (0.0528)	 	
																																											
Finding	it	very		difficult	 0.129**	 	 0.217***	 	 0.215***	 	
		 (0.0515)	 	 (0.0641)	 	 (0.0790)	 	
Subjective	financial	
situation	(as	a	
continuous	measure):		 	 0.0311***	 	 0.0271***	 	 0.0189*	
	  (0.00723)	 	 (0.00897)	 	 (0.0114)	
ln	(Total	monthly	
income)	 -0.0129**	 -0.0136***	 	 	 	  
 (0.00516)	 (0.00513)	 	 	 	  
ln	(Labour	monthly	
Income)	 	 	 -0.0155*	 -0.0162*	 	  
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  	 (0.00889)	 (0.00887)	 	  
Relative	income	(wrt		
LAD	median	income)	 	 	 	 	 -0.0186	 -0.0202*	
		 	 	 	 	 (0.0120)	 (0.0120)	
Age	group:		 	 	 	 	 	  
20-24	yrs	old	 0.0189	 0.0273	 0.00409	 0.0113	 -0.0331	 -0.0232	
	 (0.0636)	 (0.0645)	 (0.0780)	 (0.0796)	 (0.104)	 (0.106)	
25-29	yrs	old	 0.210***	 0.218***	 0.184**	 0.191**	 0.138	 0.147	
	 (0.0660)	 (0.0668)	 (0.0795)	 (0.0809)	 (0.106)	 (0.108)	
30-34		yrs	old	 0.231***	 0.239***	 0.219***	 0.227***	 0.207**	 0.216**	
	 (0.0666)	 (0.0675)	 (0.0791)	 (0.0807)	 (0.105)	 (0.107)	
35-39	yrs	old	 0.251***	 0.256***	 0.217***	 0.221***	 0.213**	 0.217**	
	 (0.0652)	 (0.0661)	 (0.0787)	 (0.0805)	 (0.105)	 (0.107)	
40-44	yrs	old	 0.245***	 0.251***	 0.233***	 0.237***	 0.269**	 0.274**	
	 (0.0660)	 (0.0669)	 (0.0788)	 (0.0805)	 (0.106)	 (0.108)	
45-49	yrs	old	 0.255***	 0.262***	 0.248***	 0.255***	 0.221**	 0.229**	
	 (0.0639)	 (0.0647)	 (0.0771)	 (0.0787)	 (0.103)	 (0.105)	
50-54	yrs	old	 0.259***	 0.267***	 0.233***	 0.240***	 0.262**	 0.272***	
	 (0.0637)	 (0.0646)	 (0.0767)	 (0.0784)	 (0.103)	 (0.105)	
55-59	yrs	old	 0.264***	 0.270***	 0.245***	 0.250***	 0.201**	 0.208**	
	 (0.0638)	 (0.0646)	 (0.0764)	 (0.0781)	 (0.102)	 (0.104)	
60-64	yrs	old	 0.269***	 0.277***	 0.235***	 0.243***	 0.213**	 0.223**	
	 (0.0640)	 (0.0649)	 (0.0775)	 (0.0790)	 (0.104)	 (0.106)	
65-69	yrs	old	 0.285***	 0.294***	 0.254***	 0.260***	 0.280**	 0.289**	
	 (0.0643)	 (0.0652)	 (0.0817)	 (0.0834)	 (0.111)	 (0.113)	
Over	70	yrs	old	 0.270***	 0.279***	 0.248***	 0.257***	 0.217*	 0.230**	
		 (0.0632)	 (0.0640)	 (0.0853)	 (0.0867)	 (0.114)	 (0.115)	
University	degree	 -0.123***	 -0.125***	 -0.121***	 -0.123***	 -0.102***	 -0.104***	
																																					(0.0133) (0.0132)	 (0.0159)	 (0.0159)	 (0.0201)	 (0.0202)	
Female	 -0.0846***	 -0.0851***	 -0.0903***	 -0.0912***	 -0.0788***	
-
0.0795***	
																	(0.0118)	 (0.0118)	 (0.0159)	 (0.0159)	 (0.0201)	 (0.0201)	
Children	 0.00266	 0.00230	 -0.00493	 -0.00636	 -0.0208	 -0.0235	
																	(0.0185)	 (0.0186)	 (0.0216)	 (0.0216)	 (0.0278)	 (0.0279)	
Ethnicity:		 	 	 	 	 	  
Asian	 -0.0259	 -0.0249	 0.0564	 0.0601	 0.0358	 0.0386	
	 (0.0323)	 (0.0325)	 (0.0395)	 (0.0396)	 (0.0453)	 (0.0452)	
Black	 -0.172***	 -0.171***	 -0.175***	 -0.172***	 -0.166***	 -0.167***	
	 (0.0387)	 (0.0391)	 (0.0455)	 (0.0454)	 (0.0527)	 (0.0523)	
Mixed	 -0.175***	 -0.176***	 -0.181***	 -0.185***	 -0.185***	 -0.193***	
	 (0.0448)	 (0.0451)	 (0.0503)	 (0.0503)	 (0.0578)	 (0.0578)	
Other	 -0.124	 -0.126	 -0.101	 -0.0978	 -0.105	 -0.105	
		 (0.0799)	 (0.0807)	 (0.110)	 (0.108)	 (0.114)	 (0.111)	
Importance	of	being	
British	 0.0206***	 0.0208***	 0.0223***	 0.0224***	 0.0205***	 0.0204***	
(0-low	to	10-very	high)	 (0.00205)	 (0.00205)	 (0.00239)	 (0.00239)	 (0.00302)	 (0.00304)	
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high)	 (0.00827)	 (0.00827)	 (0.0100)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0124)	 (0.0125)	
Interest	in	politics	 0.0281***	 0.0296***	 0.0395***	 0.0411***	 0.0583***	 0.0599***	
(1-very	low	to	4-very	
high)	 (0.00732)	 (0.00732)	 (0.00896)	 (0.00896)	 (0.0112)	 (0.0113)	
Unemployed	 -0.0534	 -0.0475	 -0.0796	 -0.0720	 -0.0326	 -0.0222	
	 (0.0383)	 (0.0380)	 (0.0605)	 (0.0603)	 (0.0738)	 (0.0753)	
Working		 -0.0158	 -0.0181	 -0.0176	 -0.0194	 -0.0104	 -0.0103	
																																(0.0185) (0.0184)	 (0.0302)	 (0.0301)	 (0.0408)	 (0.0408)	
Married		 -0.00961	 -0.00987	 -0.0243	 -0.0253	 -0.0433**	 -0.0431**	
													(0.0138)	 (0.0138)	 (0.0172)	 (0.0172)	 (0.0218)	 (0.0219)	
Rural	area		 0.00726	 0.00685	 0.00706	 0.00656	 -0.00101	 -0.00309	
																												(0.0153) (0.0153)	 (0.0186)	 (0.0185)	 (0.0265)	 (0.0264)	
	  	 	 	 	  
Observations	 6,885	 6,885	 4,305	 4,305	 2,629	 2,629	
R-squared	 0.095	 0.093	 0.110	 0.106	 0.129	 0.122	
Week	FE	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	
Region/LAD	FE	 region	 region	 region	 region	 region	 region	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Robust standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses:  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. FE stands for fixed-effect dummies. LAD is local authority districts.  Table notes, in order, are:   
(a) Overall satisfaction with life: coded from completely dissatisfied (1) to completely satisfied (7).  Completely dissatisfied is the base 
category in columns (1), (3) and (5). 
(b) Overall satisfaction with life included in continuous form. 
(c) Subjective financial situation: from living comfortably (1) to finding it very difficult (5).  Living comfortably is the base category in 
columns (1), (3) and (5). 
(d) Subjective financial situation included in continuous form. 
(e) Age group: 5-year intervals. Base category is 18-19 years old.  
(f) Ethnicity group: base category is white. 
(g). Regional dummies included in all regressions: North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, 
East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland 
 
